

## NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON'T: ON TURNING SEMANTIC INTERFERENCE INTO FACILITATION IN A STROOP-LIKE TASK

Matthew Finkbeiner and Alfonso Caramazza

(Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA)

### ABSTRACT

We use a masked priming procedure to test two accounts of the picture-word interference (PWI) effect: the lexical selection by competition account (Levelt et al., 1999; Roelofs, 1992) and the response selection account (Lupker, 1979; Miozzo and Caramazza, 2003). In the visible (standard) condition, we replicated the often-observed semantic interference effect. In the masked condition, we observed semantic *facilitation*. We take the polarity shift as a function of masking to mean that the semantic interference and semantic facilitation in the PWI task should be attributed to two qualitatively different processes. We argue that this conclusion follows naturally from the response selection account, but only with great difficulty from the lexical selection by competition account.

Key words: lexical access, picture word interference, masked priming, response selection

The process of translating one's intention to communicate into articulated speech is known as *lexical access* and although there are various points of agreement among researchers on how lexical access processes proceed, there are also disagreements. It is generally well accepted that when trying to name a picture of an object, say a cat, the intended semantic representation (CAT) and closely related ones (such as DOG, PURR, TAIL, FUR) all become active (Caramazza, 1997; Dell, 1986; Levelt et al., 1999). It is also well accepted that activated conceptual representations send activation down onto the lexical layer, thereby activating several semantically related lexical representations (but for an alternative proposal see Bloem and La Heij, 2003 and Bloem et al., 2004). Because of this assumption, a lexical selection mechanism is required to "decide" which of the activated lexical representations should be chosen for further processing. Although there is still widespread disagreement over the precise way in which this mechanism works, a prominent assumption is that lexical selection is a competitive process (Levelt et al., 1999; Starreveld and La Heij, 1996; but see Caramazza and Hillis, 1990; Dell and O'Seaghdha, 1992). According to this "selection by competition" assumption, the ease with which a target lexical node is selected depends not only on its own activation level, but on the activation level of competing lexical nodes as well, such that there is an inverse relationship between the time required to select a target lexical node and the relative activation levels of competing lexical nodes. The higher the relative activation level of a competitor's lexical node, the longer it takes to select the target lexical node.

The picture-word naming task is, perhaps, the task that has been used most often to investigate

lexical selection processes. In the picture-word naming task, which is a version of the Stroop task, participants are asked to name pictures as quickly as they can while ignoring a distractor word that is superimposed on the picture. A well-established finding with this task is that participants take longer to name a target picture when a distractor word is present (*vs.* no distractor word) and longer yet when the to-be-ignored distractor word is semantically (categorically) related to the picture (e.g., Caramazza and Costa, 2000; Glaser and Glaser, 1989; Lupker, 1979). Recently, this finding has been interpreted in terms of competitive lexical selection processes (Roelofs, 1992; Starreveld and La Heij, 1996; Levelt et al., 1999). Essentially, a distractor word that is related to the picture will be more highly activated than an unrelated word because of semantic priming from the picture, and, because of its increased activation, will compete more fiercely for selection. Here we would like to suggest an alternative account of the picture-word interference (PWI) effect, one that does not require invoking competition at the stage of lexical selection.

At the heart of this alternative account, which we will refer to as the response selection account, are the following assumptions. First, in a naming task such as the picture-word naming task, we assume that individuals, upon detecting the presence of the word distractor, cannot help but to formulate a (covert) verbal response to the distractor word and that this response is available for production before the picture-naming response. This is no different from the long-held assumption that subjects are unable to avoid reading the word distractors in the Stroop task. The second assumption follows from the limitation imposed by the architecture of the speech production system, which is that there is only one output channel and

that only one response may be produced at a time over this channel. In the case of Stroop-like tasks where an individual cannot help but to generate two responses for a single stimulus (see first assumption), we assume that individuals must “decide” between responses and remove (‘block’) the inappropriate response from the output buffer so that the appropriate response may be produced over the output channel. There are two critical aspects to this response selection process that we make explicit here. First, we assume that response selection processes operate over phonologically well-formed responses in an output buffer, not lexical nodes at a more abstract level of representation. Second, following Lupker (1979), we assume that the speed with which the decision-level response selection process may be completed is modulated by whatever relevance the non-target response may have *vis-à-vis* the task at hand; in the case of the PWI task, this is producing a name for the picture.

Support for the response selection proposal comes from a series of recent studies in our laboratory. For example, Miozzo and Caramazza (2003) found that low frequency distractor words interfere more than high frequency words in the PWI task. This finding, which is very robust, constitutes a challenge to the lexical selection by competition account (Levelt et al., 1999; Roelofs, 1992; Starreveld and La Heij, 1996). This is because high frequency distractors, by virtue of having relatively high levels of activation, should produce more (or, at the very least, *not less*) interference than low frequency distractors. Another challenge for the selection by competition account comes from recent findings which reveal that although co-ordinate picture-word pairs (e.g., car – truck) lead to interference, “has-a” picture-word pairs (car – bumper) facilitate responses (Costa et al., 2005). The selection by competition account predicts that all types of semantically related words should cause interference. Both findings fall naturally out of the response selection proposal. In the case of the distractor frequency effect, the sooner a distractor can be blocked from production, the sooner the picture name can be selected (c.f., Miozzo and Caramazza, 2003). Because high frequency words are able to trigger a response and engage the response-blocking mechanism sooner than low frequency words, it takes less time to block high frequency words. In the case of interference for co-ordinate picture-word pairs and facilitation for “has-a” picture-word pairs, we suggest that the response selection process is more difficult in the case of co-ordinate distractors because the decision mechanism is unable to reject the response triggered by the distractor word on the basis of categorical information alone. In the case of “has-a” distractors, though, these words (e.g., bumper) have little relevance *vis-à-vis* the task of naming whole

objects (e.g., car). Hence they should not compete. Why, though, did “has-a” distractors *facilitate* picture naming? Here we suggest that in the absence of any response relevance, the cost attributed to response selection processes is minimal and, crucially, is less than the benefit conferred by semantic priming.

Put simply, we assume that two independent factors play a role in the PWI effect. The first has to do with how quickly the non-target response is made available to the output buffer. Factors such as lexical frequency may play a role here. The second has to do with how quickly the “decision” to reject the non-target response may be executed. Factors which conspire to determine a distractor word’s “response relevance” (such as category membership) play a role here.

Following from this response selection account of the PWI effect is the interesting possibility that masked distractor words may produce a shift in the polarity of the semantic interference effect in this task. That is, insofar as the masking procedure is capable of preventing a phonologically well-formed response from becoming available for production, there is no reason to think that the processes needed to block the production of the distractor word would be engaged<sup>1</sup>. And, given the finding that masked stimuli have been found to produce semantic priming (Carr et al., 1982; Finkbeiner et al., 2004; Grainger and Frenck-Mestre, 1998), it is reasonable to consider the possibility that masked words may produce a *facilitatory* effect of semantic relatedness in picture naming. Alternatively, if, as the lexical selection by competition account holds, the distractor word competes for selection at the level of lexical representations, then we may expect that the masking procedure should simply modulate the magnitude of the interference effect: depending upon the strength of the masking procedure, the semantic interference effect size could range from zero to the same effect size obtained with unmasked stimuli. Importantly, the lexical selection by competition account does not predict a shift in the polarity of the semantic interference effect as a function of masking, whereas the response selection account allows for this possibility. The purpose of the present article is to investigate these two possibilities further.

To anticipate our findings briefly, we found that semantically related prime words presented under masked conditions significantly facilitated picture-naming processes; the same word stimuli presented in unmasked conditions significantly interfered with picture-naming processes, even when the prime’s display duration was held constant between the masked and unmasked conditions (Experiment 2).

<sup>1</sup>Note that this does not imply that we are presuming that the masking procedure is effective in preventing *any* activation at the phonological level; rather, we are simply speculating that the masking procedure may be effective in preventing the formulation of a phonologically well-formed response capable of engaging response selection processes.

## EXPERIMENT 1

The purpose of this first experiment was to investigate the possibility that masked distractor words in the picture-word naming task may produce a qualitatively different effect from the standard interference effect found with non-masked distractors. Assuming that the masking procedure is effective in preventing the formulation of a phonologically well-formed response, masked distractor words should not engage response selection processes and, hence, we should not observe interference in this condition. In contrast, we reason that masked distractors may produce facilitation by virtue of engaging word-recognition processes without engaging response selection processes. We expect to replicate the often-observed PWI effect when the distractor word is clearly visible because, according to our account, these stimuli are capable of engaging response selection processes.

### *Participants*

Eighteen undergraduate students at Harvard University were recruited and paid for their participation. All participants were native speakers of English and were between 18 and 25 years old.

### *Materials and Design*

Forty-six pictures were selected from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), from Art Explosion, or were constructed in our lab. Each picture was paired with two different prime words: One was a semantically related prime (e.g., *lion* – *TIGER*) and one was a semantically unrelated control prime (*boot* – *TIGER*). An effort was made to select experimental primes that were semantically very close to the targets. Each control prime was selected to match the experimental prime it was paired with on several factors, including length (letters), frequency (CELEX), familiarity, concreteness, and imageability. Two lists were constructed such that no item appeared more than once on each list. The target pictures were the same on both lists, but the primes differed. Target pictures that were preceded by semantically related primes on List A were preceded by control primes on List B, and vice versa. In this way, materials were counterbalanced across the prime factor. In addition to the 46 experimental items, there were 10 practice items that were presented prior to the critical items. Participants were assigned to and tested on either List A or B, depending upon their order of participation.

### *Procedure*

Participants named each picture twice: once in the masked condition and once in the visible condition. Items were blocked according to presentation type, with the masked condition always

preceding the visible condition. The reason for having the masked condition precede the visible condition comes from recent findings which suggest that stimulus-response mappings learned with visible stimuli may be invoked automatically on subsequent trials, even when those stimuli are masked on the subsequent trials (Damian, 2001). There is little reason, on the other hand, to be concerned that words presented previously as masked primes would affect later performance as the masked priming effect is very short lived (Forster and Davis, 1984).

The experiment was controlled by a Pentium PC, using DMDX (Forster and Forster, 2003), which synchronizes the display with the monitor's raster. In the masked condition, each trial began with a forward mask (#####), which was presented for approximately 500 msec. The forward mask was followed immediately by the prime word. The prime word was presented in lowercase letters for a duration of 53 msec (4 refresh cycles at 75 kHz). The prime word was immediately followed by a backward mask, which was a different randomly generated consonant string on each trial (e.g., MZWXNMSCZP). The use of a consonant string as a backward mask was motivated by recent findings which reveal that this type of mask is more effective than hash marks or ampersands in eliminating phonological priming effects with 53 msec prime durations (Grainger et al., 2003). The backward mask and the target picture appeared simultaneously, with the backward mask superimposed on the picture. On any given trial, the forward mask, prime and backward mask appeared immediately one after the other in the same location; on each successive trial, this location randomly varied from 0 to 3 degrees of visual angle along both the X and Y axes from the center of the screen. The pictures, subtending approximately 8.5 degrees, appeared in the center of the screen on each trial for 2 seconds or until the participants' response triggered the voice key. After the voice key was triggered, two seconds elapsed before the onset of the next trial. Items were presented in a different fully randomized order for each participant with the only constraint that the experimental items followed the practice items.

In the visible condition, each trial began with a central fixation point (+) presented for approximately 500 msec. The fixation point was replaced immediately with the distractor word presented in uppercase letters for 53 msec, which was then immediately replaced with a simultaneous display of the target picture and the distractor word. Following the same procedure used in the masked condition, the position of the distractor word varied on a trial by trial basis.

After the experiment proper, participants were debriefed and shown the series of events comprising each trial (forward mask – prime – simultaneous onset of picture and backward mask). After being shown how items in the experiment





1 and 2. In the case of the distractor frequency effect, we appeal to the same hypothesis proposed by Miozzo and Caramazza (2003), which holds that the sooner a distractor can be blocked from production, the sooner the picture name can be selected. Because high frequency words are available for production sooner, they can be blocked earlier, allowing articulation of the picture-naming response to commence sooner. In the case of Bloem et al.'s manipulation of SOA, we propose that semantic facilitation was observed in the  $-400$  msec SOA condition because the blocking processes responsible for the semantic interference effect had already run their course by the time the target was presented. In the case of the present study, we propose that semantic facilitation was observed because the masking procedure prevented the formulation of a phonologically well-formed response for the distractor word, which prevented the response selection processes from becoming engaged. We conclude that the response selection account provides for the most straightforward way to account for the polarity shift reported in the present study as well as the polarity shift reported by Bloem et al. (2004).

There are several questions raised by the response selection proposal that we have not addressed in detail here. First we should emphasize that we do not assume that response selection processes are engaged in normal speech production; rather, it is only in Stroop-like tasks, where each stimulus affords two possible responses, that a decision-level response-selection mechanism is necessary to invoke. Another possible question has to do with our claim that it is a phonologically realized response for the distractor stimulus that engages the response selection processes (which are responsible for the interference effect). If this is the case, how is it that participants do not simply say the first response available for production? That is, how does a decision mechanism operating over phonologically-realized responses "know" which response is correct and which is incorrect? Here we speculate that it is the participants' "conscious" detection of the distractor stimulus that leads to the formulation of a phonologically well-formed response and subsequently allows the participant (decision mechanism) to "know" the provenance of the response (word distractor, not picture) and, hence, the type of decision that must be made (reject or articulate). That is, we confer a special function upon the conscious detection of a distractor stimulus in Stroop-like tasks, such as the PWI paradigm.

Of course this position may be too strong. Perhaps the triggering of an alternative naming response, though strongly correlated with the phenomenological experience of having detected a distractor stimulus, is not caused by the conscious detection of the distractor. That is, there may be

two independent thresholds: one that triggers the to-be-blocked naming response and one that leads to the phenomenological experience of detecting a stimulus. Though this is logically possible and very difficult to refute, it lacks parsimony and it ignores the building consensus on the role of awareness. For example, Crick and Koch (1998) propose that the role of awareness is to make information available "... to the parts of the brain that contemplate and plan voluntary motor output" (such as a naming response; cited in Jack and Shallice, 2001). Similarly, Dehaene and Naccache (2001) argue that information becomes conscious when it is represented by long-distance "workspace" neurons, which, by virtue of their connectivity, make the information available to a variety of processes, including memorization, evaluation and intentional action (such as the formulation and subsequent blocking of a naming response). We suggest that the present findings may be taken to provide some initial support for these general hypotheses on the role of awareness by showing how awareness of a distractor word appears to "trigger a phonological response", or, stated more generally, serves to make specific information available to other processes for subsequent action.

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- Matthew Finkbeiner, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. e-mail: msf@wjh.harvard.edu

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